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INTRODUCTION

Consider this: a U.S. multinational enters into a contract with a
Chinese party - this could be a state-owned enterprise, a private
corporation, or even a Chinese subsidiary of another multinational. Suppose, after a year, a multimillion-dollar dispute has
arisen out of the contract, resulting in irreconcilable differences
between the parties. The question is: in which forum should the
dispute be resolved?'
For decades, the inevitable answer to this question has been
CIETAC, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission. Today, CIETAC represents itself as the premiere arbitral institution for resolving foreign trade and investment disputes in
China, functioning as an independent provider of practical dispute
resolution services. 2 Likewise, it boasts that it is one of the busiest
arbitral institutions, handling billions of disputed dollars each year.3
Indeed, as China's originally designated forum for foreign trade
and investment disputes, CIETAC's caseload has grown at a frenetic
pace since the late 1980s. During these years, foreign investors were
so eager to get a foot into China, described by one commentator as the
"Wild East," that they made business decisions that minimized the
high risks and potential complications of these deals. 4 As foreign

&

&

1. Zhuang-Hui Wu, International Arbitration for Chinese-Foreign Disputes:
Emerging Choices in 2012, 41 INT'L L. NEWS 1, 1 (2012). See also E. Norman Veasey
Grover C. Brown, An Overview of the General Counsel's Decision Making on Dispute
Resolution in Complex Business Transactions, 70 Bus. LAW. 407 (2015) (describing
myriad considerations in drafting provisions for arbitration in complex international
and domestic commercial transactions); Arthur Ma, Benjamin Miao & Helen Shi, People's Republic of China, in ASIA ARBITRATION HANDBOOK 113 (Michael J. Moser
John Choong eds., 2011).
2. Gu WEIXIA, ARBITRATION IN CHINA: REGULATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 7-8, 10 (2012); KUN FAN, ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A LEGAL AND
CULTURAL ANALYSIS 128 (2013); Randall Peerenboom & Xin He, Dispute Resolution in
China: Patterns, Causes and Prognosis, 4 E. ASIAN L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2009). See also
CIETAC Introduction, CIETAC, http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=page&a=index
&id=2 (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
3. JINGZHOU TAo, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 29 (2004) (noting
that since 1993, CIETAC ranked first among international arbitral institutions for
number of cases accepted annually). CIETAC may have a broader array of dispute
resolution services and lower total costs including arbitration fees, providing it with
some competitive advantages. FAN, supra note 2, at 128, 130-31; WEIXIA, supra note
2, at 29 (noting CIETAC's importance).
4. See Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in
Resolving Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People's Republic of
China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329, 331-32 (1997).
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trade and investment grew, commercial disputes inevitably developed. Thus, CIETAC and Chinese foreign trade and investment became naturally linked, as business parties needed a reasonably
efficient, fair, and effective way to resolve these disputes.
At the same time, China's early developing legal and political environment made it difficult for foreign investors to resolve disputes in
forums other than CIETAC. Chinese laws raised questions about the
validity of arbitration in other domestic and international arbitral forums, and the Chinese court system was viewed suspiciously. 5 Meanwhile, CIETAC appeared sympathetic and somewhat responsive to
foreign concerns about its adherence to international standards in its
arbitral proceedings. 6 Thus, CIETAC became and continues to be a
pivotal player in the complex development of foreign business in

China.
For these reasons, CIETAC's arbitral proceedings and arbitrators' decision-making are of great interest to lawyers, academics,
businesspeople, and politicians. However, prior to this paper, the actual functioning of CIETAC arbitrations was a black box. As with
other international arbitrations that are presumptively confidential,
only parties and CIETAC staff have access to the proceedings. The
arbitrators' written explanations of their decisions in these disputes,
typically called arbitration awards, are also rarely released. Even
when CIETAC does release an arbitration award, there is no way of
determining whether that award is representative of awards in general. Likewise, CIETAC's public footprint, its website, offers only limited and very general information on caseloads and case analyses.7
Thus, learning accurate details about CIETAC arbitral proceedings
and arbitrators' decision-making has been extremely challenging for
the business and research communities.

&

5. See WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 4-5 (summarizing foreign parties' concerns over
Chinese arbitration, remaining skeptical of receiving fair hearing). See also CHINESE
JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Margaret Y.K. Woo
Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011) (noting various concerns about Chinese justice system
more generally).
6. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Case Analyses, CIETAC, http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Article
&a =index &id=205&1=en (last viewed February 25, 2017) (providing a sampling of
only a few cases).
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Fortuitously, the authors discovered in the summer of 2013 that
CIETAC had published a comprehensive collection in 2004 of its written arbitration awards between 1990 and 2000.8 They are the original decisions, scanned by CIETAC staff and sent to the publisher.
These CIETAC awards, coinciding with an especially active and
formative period of Chinese economic and legal development,9 were
previously unknown to U.S. scholars and practitioners. Since
CIETAC has not released any other comprehensive collection of arbitrations, this information represents a true breakthrough in this
area.
This article reveals, for the first time, evidence-based details of
CIETAC arbitral proceedings, allowing an unprecedented opportunity to better understand the institution's previously mysterious dispute resolution process. Part II of the article sets the historical and
institutional context for our study of CIETAC arbitrations, confirming the prominence of Chinese foreign trade and foreign investment
in China in the global economy and CIETAC's critical role in securing
that prominence. Part III introduces the empirical study of CIETAC
awards and explains its unique research contribution. Part IV, the
heart of the article, explores the key inquiries and findings of the
study. It provides data on CIETAC arbitrations: How are the cases
resolved? Who are the claimants, and what are their nationalities?
What are their disputes? Who selects the arbitrators? Who wins and
who losses in the arbitration? Part V and the Conclusion synthesize
the implications of these CIETAC discoveries.
II.

HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Especially highlighting the 1990-2000 decade, this section begins
with a brief summary of China's history of foreign trade and direct
investment, followed by a synopsis of China's legal and economic reforms for foreign trade and investment. Finally, it offers an overview
of CIETAC's institutional structure.

8.

CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION: COM-

PILATION OF ARBITRATION AwARDS (2004) [hereinafter CIETAC COMPILATION] (32 vol-

ume set published by China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission). See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. The Compilation also
includes a small number of cases between 1964 and 1989. See Pat K. Chew, Announcing Discovery and Research on Chinese ArbitrationAwards (U. of Pittsburgh Sch. of
Law, Working Paper No. 2014-20, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443122.
9. See discussion infra Parts IIA, II.B.
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Chinese Foreign Trade and Direct Foreign Investment

China experienced phenomenal growth in foreign trade and in
direct foreign investment after it opened its door to international
businesses in the 1980s.1 0 The trade relationship between China and
the U.S. exemplifies this. As shown in Figure 1, Chinese exports to
the United States were $15 billion in 1990, growing multifold to $45
billion by 1995." By the end of the decade, Chinese exports to the
U.S. were over $100 billion, more than six times the face amount at
the beginning of the decade. U.S. exports to China also grew but not
as dramatically and beginning with a smaller base amount at the beginning of the decade. U.S. exports began at $4.8 billion in 1990, ris-

ing to $11.8 billion in 1995, and reaching $16 billion in 2000.12
Within this context, although American exports to China also grew
significantly, they did not keep pace with the rapid increase in Chinese exports to the U.S. This asymmetry set the stage for the huge
ongoing imbalance in import-export trade between the two countries.
FIGURE
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10.

See Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US$), THE WORLD
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD (last visited Feb.
26, 2017). See also William B. Greener, The Evolution of Foreign Trade Arbitrationin
the People's Republic of China, 21 INT'L L. & POLITICS 293, 293 (1989); Ma, supra note
1, at 114; see also DANIEL C.K. CHow, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES
AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 15-32 (1st ed. 2002); see also
William P. Alford, The More Law, the More . . . ? Measuring Legal Reform in the
People's Republic of China (Stanford Ctr. for Research on Econ. Development and Policy Reform, Working Paper No. 59, 2000) (questioning how foreign trade and investment are measured).
BANK,

11.

Trade in Goods with China, U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU,

foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
12. Id.

https://www.census.gov/
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While trade typically involves a buy-sell transaction for goods or
services, direct foreign investments take a variety of forms and often
involve foreign capital investment in an enterprise in the host country. An equity joint venture between a Chinese party and a foreign
party, for instance, may have both parties sharing ownership, management, and intellectual property of a Chinese enterprise, depending on the terms of the particular joint venture agreement. Other
popular forms of direct foreign investments, particularly during the
1990-2000 decade, were cooperative joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises.' 3
Direct foreign investment in China grew from 1982,14 when it
received $430 million, to 2014 when it received $128 billion. In 2014,
China was reportedly the largest recipient of direct foreign investment in the world,1 5 topping both Hong Kong and the United States.
The decade of the present study, 1990-2000, also was remarkable
with regards to foreign investment, fueled in part by China's concerted efforts to attract foreign businesses. As shown in Figure 2, foreign investment went up dramatically from approximately $3.5
billion to over $35 billion a year between the beginning of the decade
and 1995.16 Foreign investment continued to escalate for the next
two years and then leveled off, ending the decade with over $38 billion a year.1

13. See CHOW, supra note 10, at 144 (defining different joint ventures, including
percentages of each); id. at 9-11 (describing range of issues and resulting conflicts of
direct foreign investment enterprises).
14. See Trade in Goods with China, supra note 11.
15. See China overtakes US for foreign direct investment, BBC NEWS SERVICES
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31052566 (last visited Feb. 26,
2017).
16. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US$), supra note 10.
17. Id.
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Legal Reforms

China's acceleration of its foreign trade and investment in the
late 1980s coincided with the launching of legal reforms designed to
attract, yet control, the "foreign element" in China's emerging economy and society."' China was open for business with the world, but to
the extent possible, China was determining how that business would
be conducted. The invitation to invest came with myriad and often
opaque-at least to the Western mind-rules of engagement.
During the next two decades, a flurry of major new laws continued to create a legal infrastructure for the burgeoning inflow of foreign investment and trade with China. The Chinese government's
pattern was to introduce reforms on a trial basis and then refine the
details over time as it deemed appropriate in its juggling of political,
economic, and social stability goals.' 9
The 1990-2000 decade was especially formative. Numerous foundational laws were drafted, including the Contract Law of the PRC
(promulgated 1999 and effective 1999); Sino-Foreign Co-operative
Joint Venture Law (promulgated and effective 1991, revised 2000);
Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of the PRC (promulgated and
effective 1979, revised 1990 and 2000); and the Civil Procedure law
18. See FAN, supra note 2, at xxxiii-xlviii (Table of Chinese Legislation and Legislative Instruments). See also WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 3-15; FAN, supra note 2, at
9-28 (describing regulatory framework of arbitration in China).
19. See, e.g., FAN, supra note 2, at xxxiv (illustrating patterns in legislative history of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China); Jun Ge, Mediation,
Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of China, 15
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122 (1996); TAO, supra note 3, at 8.
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(promulgated and effective 1991, revised 2007 and 2012, and effective
2013). Professor Fan offers a detailed table of legislation. 2 0
Especially pertinent here, the Arbitration Law of the PRC was
adopted in 1994 and became effective in 1995. Intended as a milestone in arbitration law and in the development of the Chinese legal
system more generally, 2 1 the law remains the major legal framework
for foreign and domestic arbitration in China. 2 2 Among other topics,
it addresses arbitration agreements, arbitral tribunals, procedural
rules, and arbitral awards. It was intended to reform the Chinese arbitration system in response to a "rapidly changing economic and legal environment." 23 This reformation recognized that the existing
domestic arbitration regime was outdated and hindered the development of an increasingly used commercial arbitration system. 2 4 Consistent with this purpose, the law sets out the following principles:
i) Party autonomy (xieyi yuanze). The arbitration must be based
on the parties' agreement to arbitration.
ii) Arbitration or litigation (huocai huosong). The parties' valid
agreement to arbitrate or litigate shall be honored.
iii) Independence (duli zhongcai). The arbitration shall be conducted independently according to the law without judicial or
administrative interference.
iv) Finality (yicai zhongju). The arbitral award shall be final. 2 5
The Chinese government's legal reforms in this formative decade
signaled to foreign investors its willingness to address investors' concerns. These laws established a foundation for the huge growth in
foreign investment into the country in the next decade, moving from
$44 billion in 2001 to over $111 billion by mid-decade.

20. See FAN, supra note 2.
21. TAO, supra note 3, at 7 (describing history of foreign-related arbitration including arbitration laws); FAN, supra note 2, at xxxvii (identifying numerous regulations on arbitration-related issues; id. at xlvi (Model Provisional Rules for Arbitration
Commissions, issued and effective 1995); TAO, supra note 3, at 1-32 (history of domestic and foreign-relation arbitration).
22. WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 5-12 (describing arbitration-related regulatory
framework, including the Arbitration Law, State Council notices, judicial interpretations, arbitration commission rules, and international agreements). Chinese arbitration rules are based primarily on Arbitration Law and Supreme People's Court
interpretations, notably its Interpretation of Some Issues on the Application of the
Arb. Law of the PRC, effective Sept. 8, 2006. Id.
23. WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 6.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 6-7.
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CIETAC

CIETAC is the earliest established and most dominant arbitral
institution for disputes between Chinese and foreign parties in
China. 26 It was originally founded in 1956 as the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) as part of the China Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT). CCPIT is the government
apparatus dedicated to developing and encouraging foreign trade and
investment. In these early days, CIETAC had relatively few cases
and was largely unknown to the international business community.
CIETAC's international visibility increased with China's opening-up policies beginning in late 1978.27 As foreign trade and investment grew, so did the need for a credible and proximate arbitral
institution to help resolve those disputes. FTAC changed its name to
CIETAC in 1980, and expanded the types of disputes within its scope
as well as the number of arbitrators and staff to service its growing
caseload. 2 8 Concurrently, the Chinese government effectively mandated CIETAC as the arbitral institution for trade and investment
agreements between Chinese parties and "foreign" parties. While in
theory other arbitral institutions or ad hoc arbitration designed by
the parties without institutional supervision were possible, Chinese
law and business practices effectively required institutional arbitrations in disputes between foreign and Chinese parties. 2 9
26. Peerenboom & He, supra note 2, at 28-30 (noting CIETAC as premier institution and its overall progress, but citing investors' biggest challenges); Sarah R.
MacLean, CIETAC, From Underdog to Role Model: Bringing the ICC Back to the Forefront in the Field of InternationalArbitration, 16 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 62, 64 (2012); Zhao
Xiuwen & Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Reforming Chinese Arbitration Law and Practicesin
the Global Economy, 1 FRONT. L. CHINA 393, 397 (2006). More recently, CIETAC has
handled more domestic cases than foreign-related ones. In 2015, for instance,
CIETAC reported 1,531 domestic cases compared to 437 foreign-related ones. See
Cietac Annual Caseload (2006-2015), CIETAC, http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=
page&a=index&id=40&1=en (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
27. FAN, supra note 2, at 121.
28. Id. at 134-137; MacLean, supra note 26, at 63-64, 72 (CIETAC as state
controlled).
29. While the Arbitration Law of 1995 and Chinese contract laws do not expressly prohibit arbitrations by foreign institutions such as the ICC, other laws and
business customs indicate that CIETAC should be the arbitration institution in Chinese-foreign disputes. This was particularly the case during the more formative years
of People's Republic of China foreign trade and investment. See, e.g., Brown & Rogers,
supra note 4 (noting People's Republic of China's insistence on CIETAC). At the same
time, the validity of an agreement providing for ad hoc arbitration outside an arbitral
institution is legally questionable. See WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 19-22 (noting the law
does not appear to envision a non-CIETAC arbitration possibility); but see id. at 30
(indicating investors would appear to have choice under contract law of ad hoc arbitration outside of China).
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Thus, CIETAC, as the default provider for resolving foreign
trade and investment disputes, experienced substantial growth. It
was estimated that between 1980 and 1988, CIETAC accepted over
400 cases involving parties from 23 countries and five continents.3 0
In addition, cases were increasingly complex and involved large sums
of money. 3
As earlier described, the following 1990-2000 decade was both a
very formative period for China's legal, political, and economic reforms and a period of CIETAC's continued accelerated growth and
expansion. 3 2 CIETAC's dominance in administering foreign trade
and investment arbitrations continued.3 3 CIETAC was a key player
in China's foreign trade and investment agenda. At the same time, it
was critical that CIETAC was viewed as a credible and reliable arbiter of disputes between Chinese parties and foreign parties. 3 4
CIETAC had the challenging task of managing both roles: one as a
promoter of foreign business activities, the other as an unbiased decision-maker for any subsequent disputes.
Within this context, foreign investors and scholars voiced concerns about the perceived differences between CIETAC rules and

30. FAN, supra note 2, at 121 n.24.
31. Id.; CHOw, supra note 10, at 97-139, 179-204 (noting examples of complicated operational and licensing issues).
32. Ge, supra note 19.
33. See WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 29 (noting CIETAC's importance to China). The
volume of CIETAC cases appeared to peak in 1995, then stabilizing for the rest of the
decade. See infra Appendix. Beginning around 1995, foreign investors were able to
consider alternatives to CIETAC, including other Chinese institutions and also other
international bodies. In addition, economic ups and downs in South East Asian countries also likely affected their trade and investment (and subsequent disputes) in
China. See Wu, supra note 1, at 122; FAN, supra note 2 (noting Chinese competition
after 1995 law); FAN, supra note 2, at 122 (describing economic crises in South East
Asian countries).
34. At the same time, many critiques of the Chinese judicial system's vagaries
about the rule of law discouraged foreign investors' use of the court system. See, e.g.,
Woo & GALLAGHER, supra note 5; Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth From Facts:An
EmpiricalStudy of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249
(2001).
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generally accepted international standards on arbitration.3 5 In response, CIETAC amended its rules repeatedly. 3 6 The Chinese government also acceded to international agreements, most notably for
arbitration, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitration Awards (the New York Convention).3 7 Detailed
comparisons between Chinese arbitration rules and international
standards, such as those of the International Chamber of Commerce,
suggest numerous similarities but also persistent Chinese
characteristics.3

III.

EMPIRICAL STUDY OF

CIETAC

AwARDS

This study is unique. There is no other large-scale empirical
study of Chinese arbitrations of foreign trade and investment disputes covering an extensive time period. Furthermore, CIETAC indicates that this collection of arbitration awards is comprehensive for
this time period, so there is assurance that the study's observations
are valid and provide an accurate picture of CIETAC arbitrations for
this time period.
Other empirical research on CIETAC is exceedingly limited. Existing research includes anecdotal reports rather than studies based
on representative data.3 9 Others allow only narrow generalizations
35. CIETAC, whose purpose is to promote and to the extent possible satisfy the
demands of foreign trade, is technically part of the CCPIT. FAN, supra note 2, at 122.
At the same time, CIETAC is technically independent of the government and administers arbitrations at its discretion. However, despite its non-governmental status, CIETAC still has governmental ties. See id.; see also WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 27;
Daniel Arthur Lapres, The Role of Foreign Lawyers in CIETAC Arbitration Proceedings, CHINA Bus. REV., 46 (May-June 2009), available at http://www.lapres.net/
forlawyers.pdf (commenting on particular cautions for foreign lawyers).
36. In response, CIETAC has amended its rules numerous times in part to better
reflect international standards. WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 31-32. For examples, see id.
at 7-12 (describing State Council notices, judicial interpretations, arbitration commission rules, and relevant international agreements).
37. See FAN, supra note 2, at 14 (noting China's adoption of both the reciprocity
reservation, recognizing only those awards in other signatory states, and the commercial reservation, recognizing only awards in commercial cases).
38. See FAN, supra note 2, at 124-27 (comparisons with international standards
as illustrated by the International Chamber of Commerce operations and rules including structure and personnel management); WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 6-12 (indicating similarity between CIETAC rules and those of other international institutions or
standards, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law of Commercial Arbitration). See also
Ma, Miao & Shi, supra note 1, at 116 (giving an overview of Chinese arbitration and
arbitration in other Asian countries).
39. For example, the American Chamber of Commerce survey of American companies regarding their impressions of CIETAC was a small and not representative
sample of companies in Beijing in 2001 based on self-reports. Johnson Tan, A Look at
CIETAC: Is it Fairand Efficient?, CHINA L. & PRAC. 24-26 (2003).
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about CIETAC awards. 4 0 Finally, others focus only on a specific aspect of CIETAC. Pereenboom's empirical study, for example, is of judicial enforcement of arbitral awardS41 rather than a study of the
decision-making process for the arbitral awards themselves.
Indeed, empirical studies of arbitrations of international institutions in general are unusual. This is true and not surprising for many
reasons. First, access to large and representative, much less comprehensive, collections of arbitral awards is rare. 4 2 Likewise, international arbitrations, including those in China and elsewhere, are as a
rule confidential and private. Releasing comprehensive collections of
awards takes time and resources, and the arbitral institutions have
to figure out a way to do so while maintaining the parties' privacy.
Arbitral institutions also have limited incentives to release large representative datasets. Instead, given their finite resources, they are
more likely motivated to release a select few awards to illustrate a
point they are trying to make. Finally, foreign arbitration awards are
written in the language designated by the arbitral institution (Chinese in the case of CIETAC), which often makes them inaccessible to
English language researchers.
A.

CIETAC Arbitral Compilation

This empirical study is based on a database of 4,686 cases
brought before CIETAC arbitrators and resulting in 4,686 arbitration
decisions for the period 1990 to 2000.43 This CIETAC Compilation
consists of full-text, unedited original arbitration awards that
CIETAC indicates are "all" the awards from the designated time period. The CIETAC Compilation consists of 32 volumes of hardbound
books written in Chinese, organized chronologically by year and by
40.

For example, one study compared the win and loss rates of U.S. companies in

CIETAC arbitrations 2004-2006. See

LIJUN CAO, RULE OF LAW IN CHINA: CHINA LAW

BUSINESS: CIETAC AS A FORUM FOR RESOLVING BUSINESs DISPUTES (2007). Cao
found that in cases involving US parties (81 cases), U.S. parties' winning percentage
is approximately equal to their losing percentage, thereby concluding that CIETAC
arbitrations were "fair." Id. at 2. While this study provides useful initial data, the
comparison of the success rates of U.S. parties in comparison with the success rates of
Chinese parties, for instance, would be a more meaningful way to study whether
CIETAC arbitrators treat U.S. parties as even handedly as Chinese parties.
41. Peerenboom, supra note 34.
42. There is limited empirical research on international arbitration. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration,
86 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007); Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? ConsideringPotential
Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 825 (2011); Christopher R.
Drahazol, Arbitration by the Numbers: The State of Empirical Research of InternaAND

tional Commercial Arbitration, 22
43.

See infra Appendix.

ARBITRATION INT'L

291 (2006).
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general category of dispute. Currently, there is no digital version and
no English language version.
While the term "award" is typically used in international arbitration, the awards in this Compilation are more than the arbitrators'
decision; they also include the arbitrators' elaboration of their decision-making process. Typically, each award includes a description of
the dispute including the nationality and roles of the parties, the arbitrator(s)' analysis of the facts and of the law, and the arbitrator(s)'
decision/award. The arbitration's date and location, as well as the
size of the arbitral panel, are also known. In the interest of confidentiality, the parties' names and the arbitrators' names are not included. Some awards are brief, while others are many pages and
elaborate on the arbitrators' analysis and decision-making. In format
and content (except for the confidentiality of the parties and arbitrators' names), these awards are similar to published judicial opinions.
CIETAC published this Compilation as a one-time commemorative event in 2004. As described in a translation of CIETAC's Preface
to the Compilation:
CIETAC has cumulated abundant precious experiences over the
past 40 years. Compiling and publishing all arbitration opinions
are to summarize past practical experiences and are of great significance. 4 4 First, the compilation of arbitration opinions is to
meet the needs of the public. With the background of globalization, arbitration is now the first option for business people to
resolve disputes. Without doubt, arbitration opinions are an important window for the public to know more about arbitration.
Satisfying the needs of the public is the major motive for us to
publish the arbitration opinions. Second, the compilation of arbitration opinions fills a blank in legal research. Since the enactment of the Arbitration Law, arbitration has obtained
tremendous progress in China. However, no complete compilation of arbitration opinions has ever been published, although
few edited arbitration judgments are accessible. This is the first
time CIETAC has published its arbitration opinions. Giving a
real and full picture of arbitration judgments made by CIETAC,
this compilation is to provide a complete research source to legislators, universities, researchers, lawyers and business people.
Third, the compilation has important historical significance. 4 5
44. The Preface to the CIETAC Arbitration Compilation, CIETAC COMPILATION,
supra note 8, indicates that not all arbitration awards are included, excluding for
instance those cases where the parties settled their dispute and withdrew their application for arbitration. It remains that this generally comprehensive collection of 4,685
opinions constitutes a very large presumptively representative database. See id.
45. Id. at 1-2. Translation by Professor Margaret Woo and Jingjing Xia.
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Methodology

Recognizing the unprecedented opportunity to learn more about
CIETAC arbitrations and how CIETAC decisions are made, the authors and a research team launched a two-phase empirical study.
CIETAC organized the awards in the Compilation by year and by
these general categories of disputes: Investments, Sales and Trade,
and Property. The research team selected twenty-five percent of the
awards from the Compilation within each year and within each type
of dispute (stratified random sampling) to create an ample representative sample size of 1,172 awards to study in detail. A random numbers table helped assure that the study dataset is representative of
the Compilation awards as a whole. Two fluent Chinese language
and legally-trained research assistants independently reviewed each
award, collecting and coding information on a range of variables for
each award. In the event there were any differences between the assistants in their data collection, the principal author reconciled those
differences. Basic descriptive statistical analysis and correlational
studies between the variables and the case outcomes were used as
appropriate.

IV.

INQUIRIES AND FINDINGS

This section provides the findings of the first phase, beginning
with how cases were resolved-what were their outcomes? It then
studies the following variables and their effect on outcomes: The categories of disputes, the nationalities of the parties, who the claimants
were, the arbitral panel's composition, who selected the arbitrators,
where the arbitration occurred, and when the arbitration occurred.
A.

Case Outcomes

The outcomes in international business disputes often have significant monetary and reputational implications. Thus, the outcome
of the dispute is ultimately most important to the parties: Who is the
winner and who is the loser? Are certain characteristics of the dispute or the arbitration process positively or negatively associated
with the case outcome?
Considering the arbitration process more generally, arbitration
is widely used for resolving international business disputes, and, in
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countries like the U.S., also widely used for resolving domestic disputes. 4 6 While the parties can modify the arbitration process by
agreement, the process typically has these characteristics: (i) the parties designate the arbitrator and general procedures of the arbitral
proceedingS 47 ; (ii) the process is adjudicatory, where the parties argue their respective positions; (iii) an external party (the arbitrator)
decides who is correct and who by default is incorrect; and (iv) the
arbitrator's decision (award) is final and binding. The award thus reflects which party is the winner and which is the loser.
A contrasting dispute-resolution process to arbitration is mediation. 48 Unlike an arbitrator, the mediator is not the decision-maker;
it is up to the parties to resolve their own dispute. The mediator's role
is to facilitate the parties' problem solving, often by identifying the
parties' common ground and the comparative strengths and weaknesses of each party's position. In addition to the parties' respective
arguments on the stated issues, mediation often strives to reveal and
satisfy the parties' broader "interests." 49 The parties "interests" are
their priority concerns-what they believe is really at stake in addition to the specific issues and their respective formal positions in the
dispute. For instance, the parties may be arguing about who is responsible for damaged goods. The buyer's formal position is the seller
bears the loss, and the seller's formal position is that the buyer bears
the loss. But one or both of the parties may also be very concerned
about how the resolution of the dispute will affect their business reputation or their ongoing business relationships-their actual "interests." The mediation process legitimizes and may incorporate both
the parties' formal positions and their interests into the dispute-resolution process. Given this more conciliatory and broader mindset, mediation is more likely to result in an outcome that serves mutual
gains (and interests) rather than winner-take-all.5 0

46.

See generally LEONARD L. RISKIN, ET AL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS:
561-752 (5th ed. 2014); JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERDISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL 161-234 (4th ed. 2013).

CASES AND MATERIALS
NATIVE

47. Parties can in theory negotiate terms in their agreement, but in practice,
many parties agree to use rules of the arbitral institution such as CIETAC rules.

48. See generally NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 46, at 75-160; RISKIN, supra note 46,
JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, HAROLD ABRAMSON & PAT K. CHEW, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CONSENSUAL ADR PROCESSES (1st ed. 2005).
49. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY, & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 40-55 (2nd ed. 1991) (explaining the concept of
at 301-560;

"interests" versus "positions").
50. See, e.g., id. at 70-75.
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Social scientists, legal scholars, and businesspeople have observed that the Chinese approach to dispute resolution is more conciliatory and compromise-oriented. 5 ' This approach appears to be more
similar to the mediation mindset than a traditional arbitral adjudicatory mindset, or perhaps it functions like a hybrid of the two mindsets. A Chinese inclination, for instance, of exploring both sides of
any argument and carefully looking for fault and merit in each
party's position, has been called "dividing one-into-two." 5 2
What kinds of outcome patterns did CIETAC arbitrations have
and to what extent did they evidence the traditional arbitration
mindset rather than mediation mindset? Case outcomes were coded
in the following way: First, the researchers compared what the claimant's argument with the arbitrator's decision. If the claimant received
everything it wanted, it was coded as a "full win;" if the claimant received some but not all of what it wanted, it was coded as a "partial
win;" if the claimant received none of what it wanted, it was coded as
a "full loss."5 3
From the claimant's perspective, its ideal outcome would be a full
win. But if it could not have that outcome, its next preferred outcome
would be a partial win. Its least preferred outcome would be a full
loss. Thus, in viewing claimants in the aggregate, setting aside partial wins, they would prefer that (that is, they are "better off' if) they
have more full wins and fewer full losses. Their least preferred set of
outcomes are (that is, they are "worse off' with) fewer full wins and
more full losses.

51. See WEIXIA, supra note 2, 32-38 (describing influence of history of "harmonious arbitration"); FAN, supra note 2, at 137-68 (discussing combination of mediation
and arbitration processes).
52. Pat Chew-LaFitte, The Resolution of TransnationalCommercial Disputes in
the People's Republic of China: A Guide for U.S. Practitioners,9 YALE J. OF WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 236, 253-54 (1982).
53. Prior studies on arbitral award patterns sometimes described awards according to the percentage of the monetary amount of the claim that was awarded (e.g., 120%, etc.). This description of awards in the CIETAC study, however, was not possible
or appropriate here. While some claimants in CIETAC arbitrations stated their
claims in monetary terms, that was often not the case. Instead, claimants often asked
for some form of specific performance. For instance, in foreign investment disputes
claimants asked for revocation of the joint venture agreement, altering the management structure, or compliance with the terms on intellectual property exchanges. In
trade disputes, parties claimed, for example, return of the goods or compliance with
quality controls or delivery terms. In other words, it was not possible to objectively
quantify or monetize the claimants' demands or the arbitrations' awards, given the
nature and variety of the claims themselves.
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Partial Wins,

69.501"(

Outcomes for Claimants (All Nationalities)

]Partial Win

Full Loss

%

#

%

#

%

176

17.0

720

69.5

140

13.5

Total
#

Full Win
#

1,036 (100)

As shown in Figure 3, CIETAC arbitrators have a distinctive decision-making pattern. They are much more likely to award claimants a partial win than a more clear-cut win/lose outcome. Only
30.5% of the awards were either full wins (17%) or full losses (13.5%).
In contrast, 69.5% of the awards were compromise partial wins. This
decision-making pattern evidenced a dispute resolution approach
that was more conciliatory, presumably by recognizing that both
sides' position had some merit. In this way, CIETAC appeared to be
using a decision-making process that incorporated a more mediationlike mindset.
B.

Nationality of the Parties

Who used CIETAC? What were the parties' nationalities? Did
Chinese and foreign parties have the same success rates? In the interest of confidentiality, CIETAC did not identify the parties in these
disputes by name, but the nationality of the claimants was typically
identifiable. Numerous and diverse nationalities participated in
CIETAC arbitrations.
Claimants were from over fifty nationalities; respondents were
from over fifty nationalities. As shown in Figure 4 below, claimants
were most likely to come from China and Hong Kong, followed by the
United States, Japan, South Korea, and others. Respondents followed
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the same general nationality patterns. While parties from many
countries used CIETAC, China and Hong Kong were clearly the major users, together representing close to three-quarters of the claimants and over two-thirds of the respondents.
FIGURE

4:

CLAIMANTS AND RESPONDENTS BY NATIONALITY OF THE

PARTY

Claimants

Respondents

China

638

54.6

552

47.2

Hong Kong

250

21.4

270

23.6

USA

47

4.1

79

6.9

Japan

28

2.5

30

2.6

South Korea

27

2.4

37

3.2

Germany

17

1.5

11

1.0

Singapore

17

1.5

26

2.3

Taiwan

16

1.4

26

2.3

Soviet Union

11

1.0

0

0

United Kingdom

10

0.9

10

0.9

Canada

7

0.6

11

1.0

While the authors' subsequent research will explore in detail
how the particular nationality of the party affects case outcomes, this
article considers more generally whether it makes a difference if the
claimant is Chinese versus foreign. 54
CIETAC is truly an international arbitral institution in the
sense that foreign parties were almost as likely as Chinese parties to
be complainants and respondents. Among claimants, 42.5% were foreign and 57.5% were Chinese. Among respondents, 51.5% were foreign and 48.5% were Chinese. Most typically, one party to a dispute
was Chinese and the other was foreign. However, in a relatively
small number of cases, neither party was Chinese or both parties
were Chinese. 5 5
54. Cases involving parties from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are considered
"foreign-related" even after the British handover of Hong Kong to China. WEIXIA,
supra note 2, at 25.
55. In 44 of the cases, neither the claimant nor the respondent is from China. In
67 of the cases, both the claimant and the respondent are from China.
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CLAIMANTS' NATIONALITY

Claimants' Nationality and Claimant Outcomes
Full Win
China
Foreign
Totals

115
61
176

19.3
13.9
17

Partial Win
423
297
720

71.0
67.5
69.5

Full Loss
58
82
140

9.7
18.6
13.5

Total
596 (100)
440 (100)
1036 (100)

p=.000
Patterns differed in their outcomes, however. While both Chinese and foreign claimants were the most likely to have a partial win,
the full wins and full losses contrasted. The Chinese party was more
likely than a foreign party to have full wins (19.3% v. 13.9%) and less
likely to have full losses (9.7% v. 18.6%). Again, from the claimants'
point of view, this was the preferred better-off situation. Foreign
claimants, on the other hand, had comparatively fewer full wins and
more full losses. From the claimants' point of view, this was the less
preferred worse-off situation. These differences were statistically significant (P = .000).
C.

Category of Dispute

CIETAC organized the awards into three categories according to
the type of dispute: trade, investment, and property. The "property"
awards are more accurately described as miscellaneous disputes including some dealing with property. Thus, making any generalizations about these disputes was difficult. Hence, the authors focused
on the two remaining categories: "trade" (which were typically disputes arising from buy-sell transactions) and "investment" (which
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were disputes arising from direct foreign investment arrangements,
particularly joint venture arrangements).5 6
During 1990-2000, both China and foreign parties had incentives
to partner in direct foreign investment ventures, such as joint ventures.5 7 China wanted the foreign parties' financial, management,
and intellectual property resources for its economic development. The
foreign partner wanted to establish or expand a Chinese presence
and hoped to profit from the country's enormous business potential.
These same motivations continue to drive Chinese direct foreign investments today. At the same time, joint ventures are often based on
very complicated and risky equity, management, and licensing
arrangements. 5
In contrast, the terms of basic buy and sell trade transactions are
often more straight forward and limited, with the terms focused on
the sale and delivery of goods or services. Trade transactions, however, are not necessarily problem-free. Many potential problems such
as disputes over quality standards, delivery deadlines, and payment
delays or defaults can arise. Trade transactions also are much more
numerous than investment arrangements.
What kinds of disputes were more prevalent in CIETAC arbitrations? Did outcome patterns vary by type of dispute? A substantial
number of disputes in both trade agreements and in investment arrangements suggested that plenty of disputes existed in both categories. However, the number of trade cases was almost double that of
the investment cases, indicating it was by far the most common category of dispute that CIETAC administered.

56.

See CHOw, supra note 10, at 38-46.

57. See id. at 33-38.
58. Id. at 63-67 (establishing joint ventures); id. at 71-96 (issues in joint
ventures).
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CATEGORY OF DISPUTE

Category of Dispute and Claimant Outcomes
Full Win
Sales/Trade
Investment
Prop./Misc.
Totals
P = .002

120
33
30
183

20.0
10.4
19.6
17.1

Partial Win
409
228
105
742

68.2
72.2
68.6
69.4

Full Loss
71
55
18
144

11.8
17.4
11.8
13.5

Total
600 (100)
316 (100)
153 (100)
1069 (100)

An analysis of how outcomes varied by the category of dispute
indicated that the most common outcome for all categories was partial wins (68% in trade disputes and 72% in investment disputes).5 9
This result again suggested the more conciliatory Chinese approach
toward resolving disputes. Differences in full wins and full losses
among trade disputes and investment, however, were observable.
Claimants in investment disputes were less likely to fully win and
more likely to fully lose. In contrast, claimants in trade disputes were
better off in the sense that they were more likely to fully win and less
likely to fully lose-the claimants' preferred position.
D.

Role of Claimants

Was it more likely for the buyer or the seller to be the complaining party in a trade dispute? Buyers, for instance, might have
59. As with the statistics on this and the other variables, the total number of
cases analyzed is based on the cases where this variable (i.e., the category of the dispute) is identifiable. Hence, with many of the variables, the total number of cases
analyzed may be different than the total cases in the study as a whole.
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complained about whether the goods met specifications or whether
delivery deadlines were met; sellers might have argued about delayed
or refused payment or buyers' guarantees on the volume of products
purchased.
FIGURE

7:

CLAIMANTS' ROLES

Claimants' Role and Claimant Outcomes
Full Win
Seller
Buyer
Investment
Partner
Totals
P = .003

Partial Win

Full Loss

Total

91
38

26.3
11.7

225
239

65
73.5

30
48

8.7
14.8

346 (100)
325 (100)

34
163

10.8
16.5

227
691

71.8
70

55
133

17.4
13.5

316 (100)
987 (100)

The percentage of claimants who were buyers and who were sellers was about equal, with each group representing about a third of all
claimants. 6 0 Investment participants were also significantly represented as claimants, constituting about a third of all claimants. Thus,
it appeared that no one group had a disproportionate percent of
cases. Sellers, buyers, and investment participants all were active
claimants.
When studying outcomes, did it matter whether the claimant
was a buyer, seller, or investment partner? Yes, statistically significant differences in case outcomes for these different roles occurred (P
60. This analysis does not include the category designated as "property" disputes.
See supra Part III.B.
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= .003). Sellers were more likely than either buyers or investment
partners to fully win, and also considerably more likely to win than
claimants in general (26.3% v. 17%). When combining full wins and
partial wins (indicating the awards where the claimant gets something), the seller again was better off and the investment partner was
worse off.
E.

Composition and Selection of Arbitrators

Arbitrators play a pivotal role in arbitrations. They determine
how the disputes are resolved and their decision is final and binding;
there is generally no recourse to judicial review of the arbitral award.
While parties have little input on selection of judges in their court
cases, parties select their arbitrators. Arbitral institutions, however,
can shape and constrain their choices. CIETAC, for instance, has imposed certain limits on the parties selecting their arbitrators. 6 ' Arbitrators must be selected from CIETAC rosters, which have been
vetted by CIETAC administrators. 6 2 During this time period, the arbitrators were most likely Chinese. Foreign investors voiced concerns
that the resulting limited pool of prospective arbitrators could favor
Chinese parties over foreign parties, reinforcing a kind of home-court
advantage. 6 3
In the interest of confidentiality, CIETAC did not indicate the
specific arbitrator in the awards. However, the composition and the
selection process for the arbitrators were indicated in most of the
cases. Were single arbitrators or arbitral panels more common? Did
the parties or CIETAC select the arbitrator(s)? Did the size or selection process make a difference in case outcomes?

61. WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 23-24, 31. See also id. at 121-152 (features and challenges of arbitral formation); FAN, supra note 2, at 61-67 (comparing Chinese and
international standards in arbitral formation).
62. CIETAC is one of the few international arbitral institutions that requires
that arbitrators be selected from its own panel roster. WEIXIA, supra note 2, at 24 n.
29.
63. See, e.g., Jerome Cohen, Time to Fix China's Arbitration, 168 FAR E. EcON.
REV. 31, 32-37 (2005). See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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NUMBER OF ARBITRATORS

Number of Arbitrators and Claimant Outcomes
Full Win

Partial Win

Full Loss

Total

1 Arbitrator

41

24.4

110

65.5

17

10.1

168 (100)

3 Arbitrator
Panel

142

15.8

632

70.1

127

14.1

901 (100)

Totals

183

17.1

742

69.4

144

13.5

1069 (100)

P = .016
Arbitrators heard cases either individually or as part of a threeperson panel. As depicted in Figure 8, the three-person panel was, by
far, the most common composition: 84.3% of the cases were before the
arbitral panels with only 15.7% before a single arbitrator. In theory,
the three-person panel has the advantage of each party selecting one
member with the third arbitrator selected in a way that is acceptable
to both parties. Agreeing on a single arbitrator is problematic for two
already disputing parties.
Did the size of the arbitral panel affect case outcome? The analysis suggested yes; it appeared that single arbitrators were more likely
than three-person arbitral panels to find full wins and less likely to
find partial wins and full losses. While this difference was statistically significant at P = .016, its significance was not as pronounced as
that of other variables.
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ARBITRATORS' SELECTION

Arbitration Selection Process And Claimant Outcomes

Parties 2,
CIETAC 1
CIETAC 2,
Claimant 1
CIETAC 1
Totals
P = .000

Full Win

Partial Win

Full Loss

51

10.3

350

70.6

95

19.2

496 (100)

74
40
165

26.4
24.5
17.6

195
106
651

69.6
65.0
69.3

11
17
123

3.9
10.4
13.1

280 (100)
163 (100)
939 (100)

Totals

Given the critical role of arbitrators, the process of selecting
them deserves careful attention. As indicated in Figure 9, the study
indicated three ways that CIETAC arbitrators were selected: (i) each
party selected one arbitrator and CIETAC selected the third for the
arbitral panel; (ii) the claimant selected one arbitrator and CIETAC
selected the other two arbitrators for the panel; and (iii) for single
arbitrator cases, CIETAC selected that arbitrator.
The most common process was the first (52.8% of all cases, 64%
of panel cases), where each party selected one arbitrator and CIETAC
selected the third. This allowed each party to have input, but it also
indicated CIETAC's important role in selecting the third potentially
tie-breaking arbitrator. The second process, where the complainant
selected one arbitrator and CIETAC selected the other two, occurred
with surprising frequency (36.1% of panel cases 29.8% of all cases).
Why might this have occurred? It might be because the respondent
was Chinese and presumed that CIETAC would make arbitrator
choices not contrary to their interests. Another possible explanation
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is that the respondent was in default (for instance, not showing up for
the arbitration as required by the contract's requirements), and that
CIETAC was therefore left to select the remaining arbitrators.
Whatever the explanation, this selection process put a great deal of
control in CIETAC's hands, with them selecting a majority of the
panel. If the complainant was Chinese, the Chinese party and
CIETAC selected the entire panel. Finally, in the third process, if a
single arbitrator was selected, CIETAC selected this individual. This
occurred in 17.4% of the cases. Thus, in a substantial number of cases
(451 out of 939 or 47.2% of all cases), CIETAC selected either the only
arbitrator or selected the majority of an arbitral panel. This finding
reveals considerable CIETAC involvement in selecting the arbitrators, and thus a notable departure from party autonomy in this critical decision.
Did this selection process affect case outcomes? It appeared that
it did (P = .000). At first glance, across all three selection processes,
partial wins were the most common result and the percent of partial
wins were very similar. The outcome differences between processes,
however, occurred in the full win and full loss categories. In the most
common arbitrators' selection process, where each party selected an
arbitrator and CIETAC selected the third, the percentage of full wins
was 10.3%, which was considerably less than the full wins in the
other selection processes. Moreover, claimants were considerably
more likely to get full losses (19.2%) in this selection process. In contrast, when CIETAC selected two of the three arbitrators or when
CIETAC selected the single arbitrator, claimants got a full win about
a quarter of the time and received a full loss much less frequently
(3.9% and 10.4%, respectively). In these two processes, CIETAC had
more involvement. Thus, it appeared that with more CIETAC involvement in the selection process, claimants were in the preferred
better-off situation of obtaining more full wins and avoiding full
losses.
F. Arbitration'sLocation and Time Period
CIETAC arbitrations took place in three different cities over the
course of a decade. A closer look at the place and time of the arbitrations offered some insight into whether those variables were
meaningful.
Regarding location, the main CIETAC office was located in Beijing. CIETAC sub-commission offices were in Shenzhen and Shanghai. While Beijing may have had the advantages of better-established
facilities and resources, one of the other locations might have been
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more convenient for the parties. Shenzhen is a special economic zone
for foreign investors and is in close proximity to Hong Kong. Shanghai is recognized as a major financial center.
FIGURE 10: LOCATION

Location And Claimant Outcomes
Full Win

Partial Win

Full Loss

Totals

Beijing

127

16.8

523

69.3

105

13.9

755 (100)

Shanghai

12

11.3

81

76.4

13

12.3

106 (100)

Shenzhen

44

21.2

138

66.3

26

12.5

Totals

183

17.1

742

69.4

144

13.5

208 (100)
1069
(100)

P = .240
Where did the arbitrations take place? To what extent do the outcomes vary depending on the location? The most common site by far
was Beijing, with over 70% of the arbitrations occurring there.
Shenzhen was a distant second with 19.4% of the cases, followed by
Shanghai with only 10% of the cases.
Partial wins were the most common outcome, comprising over
two-thirds of the cases in all three locations. It appeared less likely
for the claimant to get a full win in Shanghai especially compared to
Shenzhen. However, when taking all the data into account, the location of the arbitration was not statistically significant to outcomes.
This suggested that parties could have selected the arbitration's location based on their convenience or other factors since the claimants
did not appear to have an advantage in any particular location.
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Did the time of the arbitration make a difference? As earlier
noted, major legal, political, and economic events occurred during
1990-2000.64 Notably, during the second half of the decade, the national Arbitration Law became effective in 1995.65 In addition, after
156 years of British rule, the British government turned over the governance of Hong Kong to China in 1997.66 We decided to tentatively
explore whether major events such as these affect CIETAC arbitration, at least in terms of its case outcomes.
To test this, outcome patterns in the first half of the decade
(1990-1994) and the second half (1995-2000) were compared.

11:

FIGURE

TIME PERIOD BY CLAIMANT OUTCOMES

Full Win

Partial Win

Full Loss

Total

1990-1994

30

13.6

156

70.6

35

15.8

221 (100)

1995-2000
Totals

153
183

18.0
17.1

586
742

69.1
69.4

109
144

12.9
13.5

848 (100)
1069 (100)

P = .196

Our findings suggested generally consistent patterns in outcomes in these periods. Claimants had fewer full wins and slightly
more full losses in during 1990-1994 than during 1995-2000. Partial
win patterns were very similar. When all the data is considered, however, there was no statistically significant difference in overall outcome patterns between the two periods.6 7 Thus, this evidence
tentatively suggested that major legal, political, and economic events
did not disrupt the arbitrators' decision-making patterns, indicating
some consistency and endurance in CIETAC decision-making across
time.
V.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

This unique empirical study of CIETAC arbitrations between
1990 and 2000 revealed remarkable findings about the parties, their
disputes, the arbitrators, and the outcomes of cases. This section begins by discussing the general outcomes, noting a distinctive pattern
64. See discussion supra Parts IA, I.B.
65. See discussion supra Part I.B.
66. See Edward Gargan, China Resumes Control of Hong Kong, Concluding 156
Years of British Rule, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at 1, available at http://
www.nytimes.comlearning/ general/onthisday/big/0630.html.
67. Although there were more cases during the later period, there is a sufficient
number in both periods to make some initial observations.
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of compromise awards. It follows with a graphic summary of the different variables' characteristics and their impact on case outcomes.
Overarching patterns in the findings are then highlighted. First, we
note that certain parties appeared better off: namely complainants
that are sellers (rather than buyers or investment partners) and complainants in trade disputes (rather than investment disputes). Also,
of particular note, Chinese complainants appeared better off than
non-Chinese complainants. Second, the analysis indicated that the
arbitrators' composition (whether a panel or a single arbitrator) mattered to case outcomes, as did the process used for selecting the arbitrators. Finally, the evidence suggested that the location and time
period of the arbitration proceedings did not matter to case outcomes.
Pattern of Compromise Awards. While there are some full wins
and full losses in these disputes, there was a strong tendency toward
compromise awards. Almost 70% of the claimants received partial
wins. This decision-making pattern was consistent with a more conciliatory Chinese approach to dispute resolution. Thus, one possible
explanation is that arbitrators evaluated each party's position from
that party's vantage point, and tried to appreciate each party's narrative of what occurred and why. This approach also may have served
other CIETAC goals: both parties feeling like they did not go away
empty-handed and thus more likely to feel positive about and inclined to participate in the future in CIETAC arbitrations. In addition, CIETAC would not appear partial to any one party, thus
contributing to CIETAC's reputation as unbiased.
This more compromising approach has its advantages and disadvantages for the parties. Parties that firmly believe that they should
receive a full-win will be less satisfied with a compromise award. On
a policy level, if arbitrators consider more than the technical arguments on the merits of the specific issue on the table (each party's
formal position), the parties, including future parties, may have a
less a predictable guide on what actually matters in the arbitrators'
decision-making process. In addition, to the extent that arbitrators
analyze disputes in ways that are contrary to the parties' contracts or
appear in conflict with the laws, questions about the arbitrators' adherence to the rule of law are raised.
On the other hand, parties fearing a full loss would prefer this
compromise outcome. Compromising awards may also allow parties
to continue business relationships more amicably since there is not
the animosity engendered by an outright winner and loser. As with
mediation, arbitrators may also be accommodating the parties' interests in ways that ultimately serve their relational needs.
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Party, Arbitrators, Dispute Variables. In addition to studying
case outcomes in general, we also analyzed different characteristics
of the disputes, the parties, and the arbitrators. As a final step, we
considered how these characteristics affected the case outcomes. For
instance, did the type of dispute affect how cases were resolved? Were
foreign parties or Chinese parties more likely to win? Did outcomes
differ depending on whether the arbitral panel was selected by the
parties or by CIETAC?
Our findings are highlighted in Figure 12 and summarized further below. Figure 12 captures the variable's general effect on outcome from the Claimant's perspective.
FIGURE

12:

SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND EFFECTS ON OUTCOMES

FROM CLAIMANTS' PERSPECTIVE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
EFFECT ON OUTCOMES PARTIES

Variable

Description

Effect on Outcomes

Parties
Nationality of Parties

Chinese and foreign
claimants about half
& half; many foreign
nationalities

Chinese CL better off

Role of Claimants

Comparable % of buyers, sellers, investors

Seller CL better off

Category of Dispute

Twice as many trade
disputes as investment disputes

Trade CL better off

Arbitrators
Arb. Composition

Approx. 90% 3-person
tribunals, remaining
single arbitrator

CL before single arb.
better off

Arb. Selection Process

For panel: About 2/3
selected by parties
and CIETAC; about 1/
3 majority arbs.
Selected by CIETAC.
For single arb.:
CIETAC selects

As CIETAC involvement goes up, CL better off

Disputes
Location

Over 70% in Beijing

No effect

Time Period

Over 80% 1995-2000

No effect
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Chinese Parties, Sellers, and Trade Claimants All Better Off.
Consistent with CIETAC's claim as a true international forum, entities of many nationalities used CIETAC. Both Chinese and foreign
parties initiated arbitration process as claimants, with 42.5% of the
claimants being foreign. Foreign claimants were most likely to come
from Hong Kong, followed by the United States, Japan, and South
Korea. The most frequent foreign respondents were from the same
countries. If Hong Kong were removed from the list of foreign claimants, however, only 21.8% of the remaining claimants were foreign.
A striking finding was that Chinese and foreign parties have different outcome patterns. While both Chinese and foreign parties
were most likely to have partial wins, the patterns of full wins and
full losses differed. The Chinese parties were more likely than foreign
parties to have full wins and less likely to have full losses - the claimants' preferred better-off pattern.
Thus, these findings offered some basis for foreign concern about
China's home court advantage. It could have been that arbitrators
were more likely to believe Chinese claimants had stronger arguments given cultural, economic, ideological identifications between
the arbitrators and the Chinese parties. On the other hand, it was
possible that Chinese claimants, objectively speaking, simply had
stronger arguments. Further exploration is needed to better understand what is occurring; the authors' subsequent follow-up research
will address varied possibilities.
Outcomes also differed based on whether the party was a seller,
buyer, or investment partner. As compared to those in the other two
roles, sellers were most likely to be successful. Did arbitrators have a
reason to be more disposed, perhaps unconsciously, toward sellers?
For instance, given China's economic developmental needs, arbitrators may have prioritized (perhaps unconsciously) sellers because
they provided the essential materials, equipment, and expertise necessary to fuel the emerging growing economy. Or perhaps sellers,
given their advantageous bargaining positions, were able to negotiate
stronger supplier-preferred contract terms which provided advantages in the event of a dispute. Finally, to the extent that sellers were
more likely to be Chinese and arbitrators were Chinese, perhaps arbitrators were more likely, consciously or unconsciously, to favor
sellers.
Arbitrators' Composition and Party Autonomy Matters. The arbitrators are critical to the dispute-resolution process. Their role is to
resolve disputes. Furthermore, their decision is presumptively final
and binding. This study revealed information about the composition
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and selection process of arbitrators. Regarding its composition, a
three-person arbitral panel was the most frequent (82.6% of the
time); there were fewer single arbitrator cases (17.4%). Furthermore,
the composition appeared to make a difference. Single arbitrators
were more likely than arbitral panels to find full wins than partial
wins or full losses. Perhaps as single decision-makers, they went with
their impression of a clear winner-and did not have to contend with
alternative perspectives of other arbitrators. Or perhaps CIETAC appointed more expert and established single arbitrators who could
more clearly assess the dispute.
Regarding the selection process, each party selected an arbitrator and CIETAC selected the third in 64% of the arbitral panels.
However, about a third of the time (36%), CIETAC was more involved, selecting two of the arbitrators and leaving the claimant to
select one. When there was only a single arbitrator, CIETAC made
the selection.
An analysis of the selection process, composition of arbitrators,
and outcomes revealed an interesting pattern. With increased
CIETAC involvement in the selection process (that is, when CIETAC
selected the sole arbitrator or when it selected two of the three arbitrators), the claimant was more likely have full wins and less likely to
have full losses. In other words, claimants were better offer when
CIETAC was more involved.
Two possible explanations come to mind. First, it could be that
the cases where CIETAC selected two of the three arbitrators are
ones where the respondents had the weaker positions on the merits
or were more likely to default (thus perhaps requiring CIETAC to
select two of the three arbitrators). Second, the claimants were the
party that initiates the arbitration process. They would be more inclined to initiate the arbitration process if they believed that the process will be generally satisfactory and worthwhile. CIETAC wanted
claimants to use CIETAC and was concerned about its reputation
among claimants-so it could be that it went out of its way to select
arbitrators they knew would give claimants at least a fair assessment. Whatever the explanation, the result in cases where the claimant is Chinese and CIETAC selects the other two arbitrators is a
great deal of Chinese-affiliated influence in selecting the arbitrators.
Location and Time of Disputes Do Not Matter. The study also
found tentative evidence of enduring and consistent patterns in arbitral decision-making. In particular, arbitrators had the same decision-making patterns regardless of the location of the arbitration.
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That is, the same general pattern of claimants' full wins, partial
wins, and full losses occurred in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen.
Arbitral decision-making also seemed generally consistent over
time. The study considered in particular whether claimants' outcomes differed in the first part of the decade versus the latter part of
the decade. Significantly, in the second half of the decade, major political and legal events such as the British turnover of Hong Kong to
China in 1997 and the national Chinese Arbitration Law in 1995 occurred. The general outcome patterns, however, did not significantly
differ in the second half from the first half of the decade. Thus, the
study provided tentative evidence that the arbitration process appears consistent and enduring over time and place.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Ever since China opened its doors to foreign trade and investment in the 1980s and CIETAC became its premier arbitral institution, foreign investors have speculated about CIETAC operations and
decision-making. Is CIETAC as widely used by foreign investors as
CIETAC boasts? What types of disputes and what types of outcomes
did CIETAC administer? How do CIETAC arbitrators decide cases
and what affects the case outcomes? How are the arbitrators selected
and does it matter? Do foreign parties and Chinese parties have different experiences? Rumors circulated and individuals offered their
"China stories," but there was no way of determining these stories'
truth or how representative individual experiences were. Was one
person's truth the same as the next person's?
This article replaces speculation, rumors, and stories with empirical evidence. This unique study offers an analysis of a large and comprehensive collection of Chinese CIETAC arbitration cases. Studying
over 1,000 cases, taken from a stratified random sampling of over
4,000 cases from 1990-2000, this pioneering research opens the door
to CIETAC arbitrators' decision-making and outcomes in foreign
trade and investment disputes.
Among other findings, the study supported CIETAC's representation as a busy and international forum. Over fifty countries were
included as parties to CIETAC's thousands of arbitrations. Also confirmed was that CIETAC arbitrators used a more Chinese mediationlike process, at least as evidenced by the large percentage of compromise outcomes. In addition, there was tentative support for CIETAC
arbitrations favoring certain parties, including Chinese parties, sellers, and complainants in trade disputes. Findings about arbitrators
also were noteworthy and surprising. While three-person panels
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heard most of the arbitrations, claimants appeared to have better results in the remaining single arbitrator proceedings. In about twothirds of the panel proceedings, arbitrators were selected as one
would expect, with each party selecting one and CIETAC selecting
the third. However, in the remaining panel proceedings and in the
single arbitrator proceedings, CIETAC took a more active role in the
selection process. Interestingly, the claimant appeared better off
when CIETAC was more involved.
What didn't make a difference? The location of the arbitration
(whether it was one Chinese city or another) and the time period
(whether it was in the first or second half of the decade) did not seem
to matter significantly, suggesting a consistency in outcomes wherever or whenever the arbitration took place.
In particular, the finding that Chinese parties appeared to fare
better than foreign parties is especially troubling to foreign business
parties and bears further analysis. The author intends more research
on this topic to find explanations for this disparity and a more detailed consideration of which foreign parties are comparatively worse
off and better off relative to the Chinese parties. Finally, to the extent
that this finding suggests that Chinese parties have a home court
advantage, the author intends to research to what extent that advantage is an historical aberration of this formative decade versus a
more enduring pattern.
VII.

APPENDIX

A review of the entire CIETAC Compilation of Awards shows the
following volume of cases by dispute categories and year of award.
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

Investments
17
24
25
48
163
258
147

Sales and Trade
121
103
46
144
238
409
342

Property
14
23
19
27
43
77
104

Total
152
150
90
219
444
744
593

1997
1998
1999
2000

186
203
192
153

344
312
268
279

68
87
92
110

598
602
552
542

Total

1,416

2,606

664

4,686

